Revisiting the optimal stationary public investment policy in endogenous growth economies by Marrero, Gustavo A.
Revisiting the optimal stationary public
investment policy in endogenous growth economies
Gustavo A. Marrero
Universidad de La Laguna and ICAE
November 2005
ABSTRACT:
One strand of the literature on endogenous growth concerns models in which pub-
lic infrastructure a¤ects the private production process. A puzzle in this literature
is that observed public investment-to-output ratios for developed economies tend to
fall short of theoretical model-based optimal ratios. We reexamine the optimal choice
of public investment in a more general and plausible framework, which allows for a
gradual transition between di¤erent steady states, a lower depreciation rate for public
capital than for private capital, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution that di¤ers
from unity and the need to nance a non-trivial share of public services in output
in each period. Given other fundamentals in the economy, we show that the optimal
public investment-to-output ratio is smaller for low-growth economies, for economies
populated by consumers with low preferences for substituting consumption intertem-
porally and when public capital is durable. Moreover, for a calibrated economy, we
show that a combination of these factors solves the public investment puzzle.
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1 Introduction
Early empirical work by Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) identied the signif-
icant impact that public infrastructures have on economic growth. One strand of
the literature on endogenous growth relating to models in which public investment
a¤ects the private production process has been, in part, motivated by this empirical
nding. Barros (1990) study represents an important breakthrough in characterizing
the inuence of public infrastructure on growth and welfare in an endogenous growth
setting. Subsequent work by Futagami et al. (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994),
Cassou and Lasing (1998, 2004), Turnovsky (1997), Aschauer (2000) and Marrero and
Novales (2005) are variations of Barros research. In these studies, public revenues
derive from proportional income taxes and the government decides the stable ratio of
public investment to output.
Since 1960, the public sector has gradually become less important in the productive
activity of most developed economies. While total public outlays have represented
meaningful shares of GDP during the last four decades, public investment-to-output
ratios have generally declined over the same period.1 Nevertheless, this ratio has
remained relatively stable since the 1990s. By 2000, public investment represented
3.7% of total real GDP in the OECD and 3.1% in the US. For a standard calibration,
these gures are well below the optimal public investment-to-output ratios predicted
by most recent studies. This considerable di¤erence between current policies and most
model-based optimal predictions suggests a public investment puzzle in the context
of this literature.
These di¤erences support the thesis that the suboptimal public infrastructure pol-
icy over the last decades is to blame for the productivity slowdowns of the 1970s and
1980s (Aschauer, 1989, and Munnell, 1990, among many others). However, in this
context, by using a stylized one-sector endogenous growth model carefully calibrated
for the post-war US economy, Cassou and Lansing (1998, 2004) and Marrero (2005)
nd that reduced public investment in the 1970s and 1980s accounted for only a small
proportion of the productivity slowdown.
The goal of the paper is not to discuss the productivity slowdown, on which
there is already an extensive literature. Rather, we revisit the optimal choice of
public investment in a more general and plausible framework than those mentioned
above. Our framework allows for i) long-lasting private and public capital stocks
(Ai and Cassou, 1995, and Cassou and Lansing, 1998), ii) a lower depreciation rate
for public capital than for private capital (Ai and Cassou, 1995), iii) an elasticity of
intertemporal substitution below unity (as suggested by Prescott and others) and iv)
1See Cassou and Lansing (2004) and Marrero (2005) for a description of public investment
downsizing in the OECD and the US, respectively. See also Kamps (2005).
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assumes that there is a need to nance a non-trivial proportion of public services in
output in each period (Cassou and Lansing, 1998, and Marrero, 2005). This economy
allows for a gradual transition between di¤erent steady states, which Futagami et
al. (1993) found to be an important factor in determining optimal public investment
policy in a Barro-type framework. Futagami et al. (1993) did not explicitly derive
an expression for the optimal stationary public investment policy. In this paper, we
contribute to lling this gap.
More concretely, the contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we obtain an
implicit expression for the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio in a
more general endogenous growth framework.2 Second, we assess the importance of
i)-iv) factors for optimal stationary policy. Third, we reconsider the public investment
puzzle based on a calibrated economy within our new framework.
A carefully examination of the implicit policy expression gives an important insight
into the size and determinants of the optimal stationary public investment-to-output
ratio. We show that the optimal ratio is less than the growth-maximizing ratio.
Whereas the public capital elasticity and the subjective discount rate positively a¤ect
optimal public investment policy, as is well known (see, e.g., Barro, 1990, and Glomm
and Ravikumar, 1994), the factors mentioned above have a negative e¤ect on the
optimal ratio, as we show. Moreover, the endogenous growth rate acts as an indirect
channel through which the fundamentals of the economy may also a¤ect the optimal
policy. In the nal section, for a carefully calibrated economy, we show that the
model-based optimal public investment-to-output ratio falls between 3% and 4% for
the benchmark and similar calibrations. A wider sensitivity analysis reveals that all
the new factors in the economy must be taken into account simultaneously to obtain
this result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show the public
investment puzzle within the context of existing studies. In Section 3, we describe
the economic model. In Section 4, we discuss the optimal stationary policy and carry
out a numerical illustration. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The public investment puzzle
First, we summarize the optimal stationary public investment policy predicted by
existing studies. Next, we point out the existence of a puzzle in this literature. Under
a standard model-based calibration, we identify a signicant di¤erence between these
theoretical optimal ratios and the empirically observed ratios in developed economies
2The condition we derive is similar to that derived by Turnovsky (2004) in a continuous-time
non-scale growing economy with public and private capital, in which scal policy does not a¤ect
economic growth.
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by 2000.
The pioneering work of Barro (1990) treats the ow of public infrastructure as
an input into private production. The development of public infrastructure induces
higher future returns to private investment, but also distorts private incentives to
consume and save through higher taxes. Optimal policy equalizes the post-tax return
of private capital and the return on public infrastructure. Barro obtained the well-
known result that the optimal share of output devoted to public investment equals
the elasticity of public capital in the production function, .3 Moreover, this optimal
policy corresponds to the public investment ratio that maximizes growth.
In a similar dynamic framework, Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) assume that the
stock of public infrastructure is input into private production. Since public capital
is productive in subsequent periods, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio is
, where , which is between zero and unity, is the subjective discount rate of the
representative household.4 In addition, if the government is constrained to nance a
constant share of output devoted to public services,  2 (0; 1), in each period, the
optimal public investment-to-output ratio is (1    ), as in Marrero and Novales
(2005). The negative e¤ect of a positive  on the net return to public capital makes
the optimal ratio lower than those described above.
For developed countries, public investment-to-output ratios have generally declined
since 1960, but have been reasonably stable during the last decade. By 2000, this
ratio was about 3.7% for OECD countries and about 3.1% for the US economy.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
For a standard calibration, Table 1 shows the optimal public investment-to-output
ratios implied by above works. We assume that  = 0:97 and  = 0:18 (as in Cassou
and Lansing, 1998). Since there is debate about the calibration of the public capital
elasticity, we consider a range of values for this parameter. For small values of ,
i.e., below 0.05, the model-based optimal ratios are close to current public investment
ratios for the OECD and the US. Although some empirical papers (e.g., Holtz-Eaking,
1994, Hulten and Schwab, 1991, and Tatom, 1991) obtain estimates of  that are close
to zero, a recent consensus has developed that suggests that this elasticity is between
0.1 and 0.2 (see, e.g., Ai and Cassou, 1995, Cassou and Lansing, 1998 and 2004,
and Shioji, 2001). Hence, either current public investment policies are suboptimal or
existing models omit relevant factors and hence o¤er misleading policy prescriptions.
3Aschauer (2000) obtains the same result in a similar framework.
4Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) consider the case in which public capital is not crowded out by
private capital. Since private capital has a harmful e¤ect on public capital under congestion (see
also Barro and Sala-i-Martín, 1992), the optimal income tax rate and the optimal public investment-
to-output ratio would be higher as a result.
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Related studies assume that public and private capital fully depreciate in one
period, and the models reduce to the special case of an AK economy. Thus, they
lack transitional dynamics. Moreover, to obtain analytical solutions, they assume a
logarithmic utility function (i.e., that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
unity).
Futagami et al. (1993) point out the importance of accounting for transitional
dynamics on optimal policy design. Turnovsky (2004) emphasizes this issue in a
non-scale economy that exhibits exogenous growth. In an economy with transitional
dynamics, there is a trade-o¤between consumption during the transition and long-run
growth, which causes the optimal public investment-to-output to be lower than the
growth-maximizing ratio. Indeed, assuming a log-linear accumulation rule for public
capital and a logarithmic utility function, Cassou and Lansing (1998, 2004) nd the
optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio to be g=[1 (1 g)], where
g is the depreciation rate of public capital, which is between zero and unity. If public
capital fully depreciates in one period, the economy lacks transitional dynamics and
the optimal policy is as stated by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). However, the
smaller the depreciation rate, the slower are the transition dynamics and the more
important is the welfare trade-o¤ referred to above. E¤ectively, for g < 1, the
optimal ratio is always lower than . Nevertheless, for standard parameter values
(g = 0:1), the optimal ratio remains well above 4% when the public capital elasticity
exceeds 0:05 (see Table 1).
In subsequent sections, we revisit the optimal choice of public investment under
a more general and plausible framework that allows for a gradual transition between
di¤erent steady states, and reconsider the public investment puzzle based on a cali-
brated economy within our new framework..
3 The economy
We consider a general one-sector economy incorporating a continuum of identical
rms, an innitely lived household and a government. The model is similar to those
of Cassou and Lansing (1998) and Marrero and Novales (2005), which incorporate
durable capital and productive public expenditure. We also suppose that public capi-
tal depreciates at a slower rate than private capital, that the government is constrained
to nance a constant share of output devoted to public services in each period, and
that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution may di¤er from unity. The popula-
tion growth rate is assumed to be zero and population size is normalized to unity. All
variables are expressed in per capita terms.
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3.1 Firms
There is a single non-storable consumption good in the economy, y, which is produced
with private capita stock, k, public capital, g, and labor, l. The household is the owner
of the physical capital and rms. There exists an index of knowledge available to each
rm, z, which augments the productive capacity of labor.5 The individual technology
is described by the production function,
f

k; l^; g

; (1)
where l^ is e¤ective labor, l^ = zl, and f(1; 1; 1) = A0 > 0 is a technological scale
factor. We denote by t, t and t the elasticities of output with respect to k, g and
l^, respectively, at time t. This specication is based on Ai and Cassou (1995) and
Cassou and Lansing (1998).
Assumptions 1: The function f() is increasing, strictly concave, two times continu-
ously di¤erentiable, homogenous of degree one and satises Inada conditions. Inputs
are complementary, thus cross-derivatives are positive. All factors are essential in the
production process. The average capital stock across rms, K, is taken as a proxy
for the knowledge index z available to each single rm (Romer, 1986).
Remark 1: By the Eulers theorem, linear homogeneity of f() implies t+t+t = 1
for all t.
Because rms are identical, K = k and per capita output is produced according
to
y = F (k; l; g) = f (k; kl; g) : (2)
We use F (t) and f(t) to denote F (kt; lt; gt) and f

kt; l^t; gt

, respectively. We use
fk(t), Fk(t) and fkk(t), Fkk(t) to denote the rst and second time derivatives of f()
and F (), respectively, with respect to k and so on of the indicated object, evaluated
at a particular allocation.
Remark 2: F (t) = f(t) and fg(t) = Fg(t) = tF (t) =gt for a particular alloca-
tion. However, since each rm neglects its own contribution on the aggregate cap-
ital stock, Fk(t) and fk(t) are not equal. More precisely, fk(t) = tF (t) =kt and
Fk(t) = (t + t)F (t) =kt.
5Specifying the public capital stock in per capita terms ensures that there are no scale e¤ects
associated with the number of rms. This specication can be viewed as incorporating a specic
congestion e¤ect related to total population (Barro and Sala-i-Martín, 1992).
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3.1.1 The rms problem [P1]
Since investment decisions are made by households, the rms problem is static. Firms
demand k and l, while g and K are taken as exogenous variables. Each rm pays the
competitive-determined wage w on the labor it hires and the rate r on the capital it
rents. Taking g and K as given, optimally leads to the usual marginal productivity
conditions and the resultant rm prots, , every period:
rt = fk(t) = t
F (t)
kt
; (3)
wt = fl(t) = t
F (t)
lt
; (4)
t = (1  t   t)F (t) = tF (t): (5)
3.2 Households
The single commodity good is valued by the household according to
1X
t=0
tu(ct); (6)
where  is the discount factor, between zero and one, ct is per capita consumption
of the representative household at time t and u : R+ ! R is the momentary utility
function. The household is endowed with one unit of time. Since the household does
not value leisure, this unit is supplied inelastically every period.
We use u(t) to denote u(ct), and uc(t) and ucc(t) to denote the rst and second
derivative at time-t of u(t) with respect to c. We will make use of the following func-
tions: (t) =  uc(t)=ctucc(t), which is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution at
period t, and ~uc(t + 1) = uc(t)=uc(t + 1), which denotes the marginal rate of substi-
tution between next-period and current consumption. It is worth noting that both
measures are inversely related.
Assumptions 2: The function u() is increasing, strictly concave, two times contin-
uously di¤erentiable and satises Inada conditions.
The budget constraint faced by the household is
ct + kt+1  wtlt(1   t) + kt [1   + rt (1   t)] + t (1   t) ; (7)
every period,  is the linear depreciation rate of private capital and  t is a tax rate
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applied to total income, which is determined outside of her control.6
3.2.1 The households problem [P2]
The representative household maximizes (6) subject to (7), ct > 0 and kt+1 > 0 and
the transversality condition
lim
t!1
tkt+1uc(t) = 0; (8)
that places a limit on the accumulation of private capital. The standard optimal
consumption-saving decision is given by
 [1   + rt+1 (1   t+1)] = ~uc(t+ 1): (9)
3.3 Government
The government claims a constant proportion,  , of output to fund public services,
cgt, in each period,
cgt =  yt; (10)
which is taken as given. This assumption ensures that cg continues to represent a
signicant and realistic share of economic output as the economy grows.7 Public
services do not contribute to either production or consumer welfare. In addition,
public investment, ig, is also a proportion, xt, of output,
igt = xtyt: (11)
We assume that issuing debt is not allowed and a proportional tax on total income
is the only way to nance total public expenses,
cgt + igt =  tyt ,  t =  + xt: (12)
The following laws of motion for private and public capital stocks complete the
description of the economy:
kt+1 = it + (1  )kt; (13)
gt+1 = igt + (1  g)gt; (14)
where i is private investment, g is the linear depreciation rate of public capital, which
6Since f() is homogenous of degree one, from (3)-(5), we have that  t (wtlt + ktrt + t) =  tyt.
7Cassou and Lansing (1998), Marrero and Novales (2005) and Marrero (2005), among others.
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might be lower than that of private capital.8 Given that ; g < 1, this specication
allows for durable private capital and generates transitional dynamics.
4 The optimal stationary policy
A feasible policy is a trio of non-negative and bounded sequences,  = f t; xt;  g1t=0,
with  t = xt +   1 for all periods, t. A price system is a pair of non-negative and
bounded sequences, q = frt; wtg1t=0.
Denition 1 A vector of sequences fct; cgt; kt+1; gt+1; it; igt; lt; yt; rt; wtg1t=0 constitutes
a -competitive equilibrium if, given a feasible policy , a price system q and initial
conditions k0; g0 > 0: i) flt; kt+1g1t=0 solve the prot maximizing problem of the rms
[P1]; ii) fct; lt; kt+1g1t=0 solve the households problem [P2]; iii) the technology con-
straints (2), (13), (14) hold and iv) markets clear every period,
lt = 1; (15)
yt = ct + cgt + it + igt: (16)
Denition 2 A balanced growth path (BGP) is a competitive equilibrium path along
which per capita endogenous variables either stay constant or grow at a constant rate.
The following set of assumptions, given that cumulative inputs exhibit constant
returns to scale in the aggregate (t + t + t = 1 from Remark 1), guarantees the
existence of a BGP in our economic model.9 An overbar denotes variables on such
an equilibrium path.
Assumptions 3: i) the policy is stationary, i.e.,  t =  and xt = x; ii) limk!k t = ,
limk!k t =  and limk!k t = ; iii) limk!k ~uc(t + 1) = uc, constant and positive;
iv) the return of private and public capital must be invariable along the BGP, i.e.,
limk!k fk(t) = r and limk!k Fg(t) = Fg; v) the return of private capital must be high
enough, i.e., r > 1 (1 )
(1 ) .
Following Jones and Manuelli (1997), conditions (i)(iv) of Assumptions 3 en-
sure a constant growth rate of per capita variables on the BGP. Moreover, standard
8Auerbach and Hines (1987) estimated a depreciation rate in US of 0.137 for equipment and
one of 0.033 for structures. Since private capital includes a larger share of equipment than public
capital, the estimated depreciation rate for private capital is expected to be larger. Ai and Cassou
(1995) found support for this in the form of an estimated g of just over half that of .
9See, e.g., Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991) and Jones and Manuelli (1997) for a more detailed
description of these conditions.
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arguments imply that the paths for y, c, k, g, cg, which solve the -competitive equi-
librium all grow at the same constant rate, . Finally, condition (v) guarantees that
 is positive. Although  must be positive along the BGP, it cannot be su¢ ciently
large to allow households to follow a chain-letter action; i.e., (8) must hold on the
BGP.
Remark 3: Since u() is increasing and strictly concave (Assumptions 2), the condi-
tion that  > 0 is equivalent to uc > 1.
Remark 4: The transversality condition (8) implies that the sequence of positive
elements,

tkt+1uc(t)
	1
t=0
must converge to zero. Hence, limt!1
tkt+1uc(t)
t 1ktuc(t 1) < 1,
which is equivalent to
1 +  < uc=; (17)
which is a condition that must be satised on the BGP.
Remark 5: On the BGP, uc = limk!k uc(ct)=uc (ct(1 + )). Since u() is strictly
concave and  > 0, uc is directly related to . Indeed, for the standard CES function,
u(ct) =

c
1 1=
t   1

= (1  1=),  > 0, we have that uc = (1 + )1=. Moreover, uc
is inversely related to .
4.1 The Ramsey problem
There are many competitive equilibria and BGPs implied by di¤erent government
policies. The following Ramsey problem chooses the -competitive allocation that
maximizes (6). The government is said to be benevolent because it sets scal policy
to maximize the welfare of the representative consumer, given the competitive equi-
librium conditions of the household and rms. The Lagrangian to this problem is as
follows:
max
fct;kt+1;gt+1; tg10
1X
t=0
t
8<:
u(t)  1t [uc(t)  uc(t+ 1) (1   + fk (t+ 1) (1   t+1))] 
 2t [gt+1   ( t    )F (t)  (1  g)gt] 
 3t [ct + kt+1   (1  )kt   (1   t)F (t)]
9=; ;
(18)
where the rst constraint corresponds to the households consumption-saving condi-
tion, the second represents the accumulation of public capital and the third is the
global resource constraint of the economy.
This problem has the noteworthy feature that its solution is, in general, time-
inconsistent. Nevertheless, several standard assumptions allow us to ignore the time-
inconsistency problem. We could either assume that the government can credibly
commit at time zero to future taxes, or we could restrict scal policy to be stationary.
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In either case, since we want to compare our solution with optimal stationary policies
predicted by existing studies, we solve the Ramsey problem and focus on the optimal
long-run, stationary public investment policy. Interior optimal conditions for this
problem are shown in the Appendix.
Conditions (38)(44) describe the optimal stationary policy on the BGP. Combin-
ing (38) and (41), the optimal stationary policy must satisfy the following condition:


1 + (1   ) Fg   g

= uc: (19)
The marginal rate of transformation between current output and available public
capital  net of depreciation and discounted by the factor  must equalize the
rate at which the household wishes to substitute current and future consumption. A
high level of uc means that the household places little value on future consumption
relative to current consumption. Thus, given other economic fundamentals and the
proportion  of total resources used by the government to fund public consumption,
the optimal public investment policy should hardly crowd out current consumption, in
which case, the public investment-to-output ratio should be low. The productivity of
public capital is high in this case and the left-hand side of (19) equals the right-hand
side. Similar reasoning applies to economies with low levels of uc.
In addition, given the equation for public capital accumulation (43), we have
Fg = 
g + 
x
: (20)
Substituting (20) into (19) reveals that the optimal stationary public policy, x+ and
+, must be such that
x+ =  (1   )  + g
uc    (1  g) ; (21)
+ = x+ +  : (22)
For (21)(22) to be conditions for an interior optimal stationary policy, the associated
 must be positive and must satisfy the transversality condition, (17), i.e.,
1 < 1 +  < uc=: (23)
We focus on interior optimal policies.10 The following proposition summarizes this
important result under these circumstances:
Proposition 3 Given Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and considering interior solutions,
10Numerically, we check that whether the solution to (21) violates the feasibility conditions only
for unrealistic parameterizations.
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there exists a unique and positive stationary public investment-to-output ratio that
solves (21) on the BGP.
Proof. Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution
to the competitive equilibrium for any given feasible policy. Following a standard
argument, this result derives from the theorem of the maximum, since the choice set is
compact and the objective function is strictly concave and continuous. Assumptions 3
guarantees that the BGP has a constant and positive steady-state growth rate. Solving
for the BGP equilibrium given the level of x in (21) yields a unique optimal stationary
policy. Moreover, since uc > 1,  > 0 and ; g < 1, this x is positive
In general, since  and uc depend on fundamentals and policy parameters in a
non-trivial manner, an explicit expression for the optimal stationary policy cannot be
obtained.11 The next two corollaries particularize condition (21) for specic environ-
ments. The unique environment in which an explicit expression for the optimal public
investment ratio can be determined is described in the rst corollary. The result in
the second corollary is used to carry out the numerical exercise below.
Corollary 4 Assume that u(t) is consistent with uc = 1 +  (i.e., u(t) = log ct and
thus  = 1). If g = 1, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio is the standard
 (1   ).
Corollary 5 Assume that u(t) is the standard CES function,

c
1 1=
t   1

= (1  1=),
with  > 0, where  is constant for all periods t. The optimality condition (21) is
then given by
x+ =  (1   )  + g
(1 + )1=    (1  g)
: (24)
Although, in general, we cannot obtain an explicit expression for x+, several im-
portant results arise from a careful examination of (21). As a point of reference,
we take the standard optimal ratio,  (1   ). From (21), it is easy to show that
x+ < (>) (1   ) whenever the following condition holds:
1 +  < (>)uc + (1  g) (1  ) : (25)
Since uc > 1 and ; g < 1, it is worth noting that the right-hand side term in
(23) is higher that the right-hand side expression in (25) for any feasible level of
uc; ; g. Thus, in theory, x+ might be above or below the threshold  (1   ). The
11Although Futagami et al. (1993) pointed out that the optimal stationary public investment
policy may di¤er substantially in an economy with transition dynamics, they did not specify the
condition for this. Our condition (21) contributes in this respect.
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following proposition states this result in accordance with the relationship among the
key variables , uc and g.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and considering interior solutions:
i) if uc > 1 + , the optimal public investment-to-output ratio, x+, is lower than
 (1   ) for any level of g; ii) if uc = 1+ and g < 1, x+ is also below  (1   );
iii) if uc = 1 +  and g = 1, x+ is equal to  (1   ); iv) if uc < 1 +  and g = 1,
x+ is higher than  (1   ); v) nally, if uc < 1 +  and g < 1, the condition (25)
must be checked to determine whether x+ is greater than or less than  (1   ).
Although the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio may exceed
 (1   ), it cannot do so by much. Indeed, the next proposition shows that the
ratio cannot exceed  (1   ). This threshold is the ratio that maximizes the steady-
state growth rate in the related model of Marrero and Novales (2005), in which  is
positive.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and considering interior solutions,
the optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio is less than  (1   ).
Proof. Rewrite the optimal public investment-to-output ratio as  (1  g) +g
1=uc (1 g) .
The second term in this expression is less than unity, given (17) and, therefore,
x+ <  (1  g)
In an economy in which consumers place little value on current consumption in
terms of future consumption, a benevolent government sets a high level of x+, gener-
ally above  (1   ) and close to the level that maximizes growth,  (1   ). As a
consequence, the resulting di¤erence between economic growth and the marginal rate
of substitution between future and current consumption would be large. However, the
optimal public investment-to-output ratio does not exceed the ratio that maximizes
growth, because under this policy there would be less consumption and growth on the
BGP. On the other hand, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio would be well
below  (1   ) and the resulting di¤erence between  and uc would be small. In
short, the optimal public investment-to-output ratio would be smaller for low-growth
economies, economies populated by consumers with low preferences for substituting
consumption intertemporally and with long-lasting public infrastructures.
4.2 Direct and indirect e¤ects on the optimal policy
From (21), it is clear that the following fundamentals of the economy directly a¤ect
optimal public investment policy: ; ;  , g and uc - or  from Remark 5. While
the e¤ects on x+ of , , g and  are positive, that of  on x+ is negative. The
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intuition behind these relationships is straightforward. A lower discount factor, ,
and a smaller marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption
means that households have a higher preference for current consumption relative to
future consumption. On the other hand, a lower depreciation rate implies slower
transition dynamics. Since  < 1, the future (i.e., the long run) is less important
than the short run for aggregate welfare under these circumstances. Lastly,  is
positively related to the rate of return on public capital, while a higher  implies that
a higher proportion of output must be nanced by distortionary taxes, which reduces
the return to private investment.
In addition, changes in these fundamentals might have indirect e¤ects on the op-
timal policy through their e¤ects on the endogenous growth rate. Indeed, the private
capital depreciation rate can only a¤ect the optimal policy through this channel. The
total e¤ect of all the other factors on the optimal policy is the sum of the direct
and indirect e¤ects. For a calibrated economy, we evaluate these e¤ects in the next
section. We show that the strength of the indirect e¤ects depends largely on the
depreciation rate of public capital and on householdspreferences between present
and future consumption. For instance, if 1=uc = 1 + , in which case, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is unity, and if public capital fully depreciates in one
period, the optimal public investment ratio is  (1   ), and there is no indirect
e¤ect.
4.3 A numerical illustration
We proceed next to look at numerical solutions for a calibrated economy that re-
sembles some steady-state characteristics of the US postwar economy. We assume
particular functional form of u() and f() and assign values to parameters in order to
illustrate the relationship between the optimal stationary policy and the fundamentals
of the economy.
We specify the per-period utility function of the CES class as
u(c) =
c1 1=
1  1= ,  > 0: (26)
Meanwhile, the production function is a standard Cobb-Douglas function with public
and private capital, a spillover factor and constant returns to scale in all factors
productivity,
f(k; l^; g) = A0k
 (zl) g; (27)
F (k; l; g) = A0l
k+g; with + +  = 1: (28)
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For these particular functions, the solution of the system (29), (30) and (24) gives
the steady-state value of the public capital to private capital ratio, g=k, the economic
growth rate  and the optimal stationary policy x+,

h
1   + (1  x   )A0
 
g=k
i   (1  g)  xA0  g=k 1 = 0; (29)
 + g   xA0
 
g=k
 1
= 0: (30)
Condition (29) comes from combining (42) and (43), while (30) is the particularization
to (43). From (29)-(30), it is easy to show that steady-state growth is maximized
setting the standard x = (1   ).
4.3.1 Values of the parameters
The parametrization of the baseline economy is standard. The time unit is the nat-
ural year. Based on King et al. (1988) and many others, we choose  = 0:58, the
labor elasticity in the Cobb-Douglas technology. We use  = 0:5, as considered by
Prescott and others. For depreciation rates, we take those levels estimated by Ai
and Cassou (1995):  = 0:094 and g = 0:038. The value  = 0:18 implies that the
government spending on nonproductive goods and services is 18% of output, which is
consistent with its post-war average. Since the elasticity of public capital is the most
controversial parameter to assign an unquestionable value, a range of values will be
examined.12 For the benchmark economy, however,  is chosen together with A0 and
 to match a steady-state per capita growth rate of 2:9%, to reproduce a public to
private capital ratio of 0:55 with x = 0:052 and an after-tax interest rate of 6.9%,13
which are consistent with their levels in the 60s for the U.S. economy. Finally, recall
that ,  and  are not independent, since +  +  = 1.
For our model economy, the baseline calibration sets the private investment-to-
output ratio to a little under 18%, the share of output that is devoted to private
consumption to be about 60% and total public receipts as a percentage of output
12For instance, Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990) estimate very high values of , equal to
0.39 and 0.34, respectively. Lynde and Richmond (1992) and Ai and Cassou (1995) account for
non-stationarity in the data and estimations are smaller but still signicant: the former estimates
 = 0:2 using time series techniques, while the latter estimates ' between 0.15 and 0.2, using a
GMM estimation process. In a more recent paper, Shioji (2001) uses dynamic pannel techniques
and estimate the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure to be somewhere around 0.1 and
0.15. On the other hand, papers by Holtz-Eaking (1994), Hulten and Schwab (1991) and Tatom
(1991), among others, put that estimation very close to zero. Sturm et al. (1997) show a selective
review of these empirical studies.
13See Cooley and Prescott (1995). Introducing privately issued real bonds into the consumer
budget constraint, the optimally condition for bonds leads to 1 + r = exp (   ln). We calibrate
 by setting r = 0:069 and  = 0029 in this expression.
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to be a little under 25%. These ratios are common for the post-war U.S. and other
develop economies.
We report the values of the parameters for the baseline economy in Table 1. Notice
that  = 0:093 - similar to that estimated by Shioji (2001) - and the resultant value
of  is 0:327, similar to the capital share used in the literature.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
4.3.2 Simulation results
We rst show the quantitative properties of the baseline economy. Then, we conduct a
sensitivity analysis with respect to the following important parameters: the elasticity
of public capital, ; the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ; the share of output
devoted to public services,  ; and the public and private capital depreciation rates,
g and . The sensitivity analysis facilitates understanding of the determinants of the
optimal stationary policy and of the level of the optimal investment-to-output ratio.
In general, the numerical exercise helps solve the public investment puzzle described
in Section 2.
For each parameterization, we solve the system (29), (30) and (24) numerically.
We limit the sensitivity analysis to parameterizations that generate interior opti-
mal policy solutions (i.e., condition (23) must be satised). Table 2 reports the
optimal stationary public investment-to-output ratio under alternative parameteriza-
tions. The table is divided into blocks, one for each parameter. The rst row of each
block shows the optimal policy for the associated parameterization. The second row
reports the public investment ratio that is consistent with a constant growth rate.
They may di¤er each other because of the indirect e¤ect.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The rst column in the table reports the optimal stationary policy for the baseline
economy. This implies that public investment must be 3:94% of real output. It is
worth noting that the optimal ratio is between 3% and 4% for minor changes in all
important parameters. For the baseline economy, the optimal ratio is substantially
less than the standard (1    ) = 7:4%. The associated growth rate is 2:8% and
the marginal rate of substitution between future and current consumption is 1:057.
Thus, for the baseline economy, 1+  is evidently lower than uc. All these results are
consistent with Proposition 6.
Other important macro ratios under the optimal policy are: c=y = 61:1%, ik=y =
17% and g=k = 43%. With respect to the baseline economy, the public sector turns
out to be less important for private production, and the public to private capital ratio
has fallen from 55% to 43%. On the other hand, private consumption and private
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investment represent a greater shares of output. These features are consistent with
the macroeconomic trends in developed economies during recent decades (see Section
2).
For the baseline economy, it is worth noting that the optimal public investment-to-
output ratio is very similar to the average ratio in OECD countries and slightly above
the ratio for the US, based on data for 2000 (see Table 1). Hence, economic elements
may explain the public investment puzzle described in Section 2. Moreover, our results
indicate that all elements combine to generate an optimal public investment-to-output
ratio of between 3% and 4% under a realistic calibration.
The e¤ect of  and  on the optimal policy is clearly positive from (24), as in
existing studies. We focus on the new e¤ects of g, ,  and . The optimal ratio
rises with the public capital depreciation rate. Moreover, x+ approaches (1  ) and
(1    ) if public capital fully depreciates in one period. In principle, a su¢ ciently
low g is needed to achieve a level of x+ below 4% for a reasonable calibration of
the economy. However, this condition is not su¢ cient. In addition, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution must be less than unity. Indeed, using the benchmark
level of g, the optimal ratio is 5:62 and just below (1  ) for  = 1 and  = 1:625,
respectively. In addition,  must be higher than about 0:15 for the optimal ratio
being less than 4%. For instance, if  = 0, and all other parameters are unchanged,
the optimal ratio is about 5%.
The overall e¤ects of g and  on the optimal policy are mainly direct e¤ects,
similarly to the e¤ect of public capital elasticity. On the other hand, the indirect
e¤ect predominates in the overall e¤ect of a change in , especially when  di¤ers
greatly from unity. The e¤ect of  is completely indirect.
In short, in our economic model, a public consumption-to-output ratio of above
about 0:15, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of less than unity, a public
capital elasticity of below about 0:15 and a depreciation rate of capital of less than
0:125 are necessary for the optimal public investment-to-output ratio to be less than
4%. Parameter values in these ranges are commonly used in studies of economic
growth in developed economies.
5 Final remarks
We have revisited the optimal choice of public investment in a more general and
plausible framework than those considered by most earlier papers in the endogenous
growth literature. The following key elements are combined in a standard dynamic
setting that incorporates public capital: (i) public and private capital are durable,
which allows for a gradual transition between di¤erent steady states, (ii) public capi-
tal depreciates at a lower rate than private capital, (iii) the elasticity of intertemporal
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substitution is less than unity, (iv) a signicant proportion of output is devoted to
public services. Each of these factors were shown to play an important role in the
optimal policy design proposed in earlier studies. In this context, a general condition
for optimal public investment policy was derived. This condition depends on the
endogenous growth rate and an explicit expression for the optimal policy is unobtain-
able. Nevertheless, careful examination of the implicit condition reveals important
ndings.
The optimal public investment-to-output ratio is less than the ratio that max-
imizes growth. We showed that the optimal public investment-to-output ratio is
smaller for low-growth economies and for economies populated by consumers with
low preferences for substituting consumption intertemporally. In general, given the
fundamentals of the economy, a developed country with an initial high growth rate
tends to stabilize its growth rate. Ination and interest rates tend to fall and the
nancial sector becomes more competitive and e¢ cient. Low interest rates and the
development of exible nancial and credit markets tend to reduce the marginal rate
to intertemporal substitution of consumption. Our ndings suggest that this trend
should be accompanied by an optimal strategy that reduces the share of output de-
voted to public investment. This pattern is consistent with recent trends in most
developed economies.
The public capital elasticity and the discount factor in the utility function are
two important determinants of the optimal policy, as earlier papers have already
shown. The negative e¤ect of the share of output devoted to public consumption
is worth noting. Finally, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the public
capital depreciation rate have positive and important e¤ects on the optimal public
investment-to-output ratio. In addition to a¤ecting the optimal ratio directly, these
parameters may also a¤ect the optimal policy indirectly through the endogenous
growth rate. This indirect channel is particularly important for measuring the overall
e¤ect of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the e¤ect of the private capital
depreciation rate. For other parameters, the total e¤ect is dominated by the direct
e¤ect.
Finally, we used a calibrated economy to estimate the optimal public investment-
to-output ratio and to resolve an existing puzzle in the public investment literature.
This puzzle is that current public investment-to-output ratios of about 3% or 4%
for developed economies are well below the optimal ratios predicted by most earlier
theoretical models. For our calibrated economy, we showed that each of the models
elements contribute to generating optimal public investment-to-output ratios of less
than 4%.
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5.1 Appendix: Optimal conditions
The existence and uniqueness of a solution to the Ramsey problem is guaranteed by
Assumptions 1 to 3. This result derives from the theorem of the maximum, since the
choice set in this problem is compact and the objective function is strictly concave
and continuous.14
We dene the following ratios: ~3t = 3t=uc(t), ~2t = 2t=uc(t), ~1t = 1t=kt+1
and ~uc(t) = uc(t)=uc(t + 1). The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is denoted
by t =  uc(t)=ctucc(t). We use that lt = 1 every period. Using these denitions,
optimal conditions for t > 0 of the Ramsey problem (18) are:15
 t :  t~1t 1 + ~2t   ~3t = 0; (31)
ct : 1 +
1
t
1t
ct
  ~3t   1
t
1t 1
ct
[1   + fk(t) (1   t)] = 0; (32)
kt+1 : ~1t (1   t+1) kt+1@fk(t+ 1)
@k
~u 1c (t+ 1)  ~3t + (33)
: +~2t+1 ( t+1    )Fk(t+ 1)~u 1c (t+ 1) +
: +~u 1c (t+ 1)~3t+1

(1  ) + (1   t+1)~u 1c (t+ 1)Fk(t+ 1)

= 0;
kgt+1 : ~1t~u
 1
c (t+ 1) (1   t+1) kt+1
@fk(t+ 1)
@g
  ~2t + (34)
: +~u 1c (t+ 1)~2t+1 [( t+1    )Fg(t+ 1) + (1  g)] +
: +~u 1c (t+ 1)~3t(1   t+1)Fg(t+ 1) = 0;
1t : uc(t)  uc(t+ 1) (1   + fk(t+ 1) (1   t+1)) = 0; (35)
2t : gt+1   ( t+1    )F (t)  (1  g)gt = 0; (36)
3t : ct + kt+1   (1  )kt   (1   t)F (t) = 0: (37)
On the BGP, aggregate variables y; c; k and kg grow at the constant rate ,
while ~1, ~2, ~3, ~uc,  and the tax rate must be constant. We omit the subindex
t along such equilibrium path in what follows. Linear homogeneity of f() implies
limk!k
@fk()
@g
k =  Fg and limk!k k
@fk()
@k
=  Fk  fk. On the BGP, conditions (31)-(37)
14See Glomm and Ravikumar (1999) for a detailed discussion of existence and uniqueness in a
similar framework.
15The time-inconsistency problem appears because the optimal condition of a time-variant tax
rate might be di¤erent for t = 0 than for t > 0. We focus on stationary policies and on steady-state
conditions, so we do not concern about this problem.
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reduces to:
 : ~2   ~3 = ~1 (38)
c : 1 +
1

~1(1 + )
k
c
  ~3   1

~1
k
c

1   + fk (1  )

= 0; (39)
k : ~1u
 1
c (1  )
 
 Fk   fk
  ~3 + ~2 (    ) u 1c Fk + (40)
: +u 1c ~3

(1  ) + (1  )u 1c Fk

= 0
kg : ~1u
 1
c (1  ) Fg   2 + u 1c 2

(    ) Fg + 1  g

+ (41)
: +u 1c 3(1  ) Fg = 0;
1 : 1  u 1c

1   + fk (1  )

= 0; (42)
2 :  + g   (    ) Fg= = 0; (43)
3 :
c
k
+  +    (1  ) Fk=(1  ) = 0: (44)
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